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To the Editors (William Z.Y. Wang writes):
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth argue that despite China’s impressive growth
in material power, the United States will remain the international system’s hegemonic
leader for the foreseeable future.1 Implicit in this assertion is the assumption that China
is not in a position to undermine U.S. hegemony until it overtakes the United States in
overall material power. This view, however, overlooks two issues critical to scholars’
understanding of the power dynamics between China and the United States.
The ªrst critical issue concerns the nonmaterial aspects of Chinese power, an issue
that Brooks and Wohlforth assume away. Nonmaterial power, by deªnition, involves a
state’s capacity to govern a society from which it can mobilize potential military and
economic strength to cope with geopolitical challenges.2 In recent decades, China’s
spectacular economic growth has produced sweeping societal changes that now chal-
lenge the Chinese Communist Party’s capacity to rule.3 The Party’s acute sense of re-
gime vulnerability may lead Chinese leaders to pursue a strategy of international
assertiveness designed to challenge the United States’ hegemonic leadership. There are
two reasons why they may do so sooner rather than later. First, they may believe that
increased international assertiveness could help boost their domestic legitimacy. To
challenge U.S. hegemonic leadership is to claim equal standing with the United States
in the international arena. Thus, the greater the challenge China can pose, the more
credible its leaders’ claim to enhancing China’s international status appears to domestic
audiences.4 Second, fearing that regime vulnerability could produce a signiªcant de-
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cline in China’s power, the leadership might seek to extract immediate concessions
from the United States before that vulnerability is deemed unsustainable.5
The second critical issue is that Brooks and Wohlforth discount the possibility that
Chinese assertiveness could undermine U.S. hegemonic leadership indirectly. China’s
growing power and increasing assertiveness are generating regionwide tensions char-
acterized by arms races, entangling alliance commitments, nationalist sentiments, and
repeated crises involving China and the United States’ diplomatic partners in East
Asia.6 By generating regional tensions, Chinese assertiveness threatens to erode the
foundation of U.S. hegemonic leadership, which, by deªnition, commits the United
States to be the dominant provider of international public goods, while allowing it to
reap the lion’s share of beneªts.7 In competing with an assertive China for geopolitical
inºuence, the United States may have to assume more commitments to maintain the
current international order while restraining itself from reaping short-term beneªts if it
wants to keep its allies and diplomatic partners on its side. Eventually, the United
States could decide that it no longer wants to bear this burden.
This scenario may not be merely hypothetical. The collapse of the Bretton Woods sys-
tem serves as a cautionary tale that, for the United States, being the preeminent leader
of the liberal internationalist order could become unsustainable.8 And recently, voices
urging the United States to disengage from some of its many international commit-
ments have grown louder.9 China’s assertive diplomacy could aggravate this trend if it
succeeds in polarizing East Asian states and motivates a bipolar struggle with the
United States for regional leadership. Given this possibility, an exploration of China’s
incentives to undermine the United States’ hegemonic order and the international im-
plications of China’s challenge seems warranted.
—William Z.Y. Wang
London, United Kingdom
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Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth Reply:
William Wang rightly stresses that our article did not assess nonmaterial sources of
power or seek to predict China’s speciªc strategic choices.1 Mindful of the inherent
challenges of measuring soft power and discerning China’s future intentions, we
focused on a question we could answer: Will changes in the material scales of power
cause the United States’ role as the international system’s sole superpower to end soon?
Too often the concept of polarity informs answers to this question that are themselves
polarized between claims that everything is changing or nothing is. We developed an
approach to assessing the rise and fall of great powers tailored to the economic and
technological realities of the twenty-ªrst century and found that no state, including
China, is in a position to match or displace the material wellsprings of the United
States’ superpower position for many decades. Yet China’s rise is a major change that,
together with other developments in international politics—notably, Russia’s increased
capabilities and assertiveness—clearly makes the current period more challenging for
the United States than the halcyon 1990s.
Wang argues that domestic incentives might induce Chinese leaders to “challenge
the United States’ hegemonic leadership.” We are not sure how he deªnes “chal-
lenge” or “hegemonic leadership,” so it could be that we agree. As we noted, nothing in
our article contradicts Thomas Christensen’s admonition that China can “pose prob-
lems without catching up.”2 Any state is free to challenge U.S. leadership, and one need
look no further than Moscow, Tehran, Caracas, or Pyongyang to see that many do.
China’s leadership may conclude that domestic payoffs to being seen as standing up to
the United States warrant the costs and risks. Many scholars argue that this is already
occurring. The key questions concern how far China and other states are willing to
go to pursue such challenges and what are their prospects for success. Our article
showed that whatever China does to challenge the United States, for decades it will
not be able to create the capabilities needed to command the commons and perform a
superpower’s global role or to prevent the United States from doing so.
Given the robust material underpinnings of the U.S. superpower position, we agree
with Wang that the most likely way that “Chinese assertiveness could undermine U.S.
hegemonic leadership” is “indirectly,” by raising the costs of sustaining the U.S. role in
East Asia to the point that the United States decides to retrench from its global role. Just
because the United States is capable of sustaining its regional and global positions does
not mean that it will choose to do so. We agree that the costs and risks are now higher,
which is why we argued that the United States should concentrate on its core missions
and shift to a denial strategy vis-à-vis China to reduce potential crisis escalation risks.
Still, our view of the scale of the challenge is more optimistic than Wang’s, in signiªcant
part because we see “local counterbalancing” (a concept one of us developed in this
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journal in a 1999 article3) as working to Beijing’s disadvantage. To this point, greater
Chinese assertiveness has certainly led China’s neighbors to enhance security coopera-
tion with Washington, lowering the overall costs to the United States of sustaining its
position. And while we are sensitive to the difªculty of evaluating the balance of non-
material power, we see no reason to disagree with Joseph Nye’s assessment that the real
issue today concerns “the limits of Chinese soft power” and that “as long as China fans
the ºames of nationalism and holds tight the reins of party control, its soft power will
always remain limited.”4
Ultimately, we could not agree more with Wang that the crucial question is
America’s grand strategic choice. The greatest potential for a change in the U.S. global
position lies within the United States itself. In our article, we showed that the United
States will long possess the material wherewithal to sustain the deep engagement strat-
egy whose fundamental underpinnings it has maintained for the last seven decades.
We were able only to suggest brieºy some reasons why the best course of action for the
United States is to focus on the core elements needed to sustain that strategy rather
than to expand its aims or retrench; we address this issue in great detail in other publi-
cations, which show that the beneªts to the United States of sustaining a globally en-
gaged strategy decisively outweigh the costs—even in view of China’s challenges in
East Asia and Russia’s in Europe.5 Whether that logic and evidence will prevail in U.S.
domestic politics remains an open question.
—Stephen G. Brooks
Hanover, New Hampshire
—William C. Wohlforth
Hanover, New Hampshire
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